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Abstract
Elliptic curve multiplications can be improved by replacing the stan-
dard ladder algorithm’s base 2 representation of the scalar multiplicand,
with mixed-base representations with power-of-2 bases, processing the n
bits of the current digit in one optimized step. For this purpose, we
also present a new methodology to compute, for Weierstrass form elliptic
curves in the affine plane, operations of the type mP + nQ where m and
n are small integers. This provides implementations with the lower cost
than previous algorithms, using only one inversion. In particular, the pro-
posed techniques enable more opportunities for optimizing computations,
leading to an important speed-up for applications based on elliptic curves,
including the post-quantum cryptosystem Super Singular Isogeny Diffie
Hellman (SIDH).
1 Introduction
The most popular forms of public-key cryptography for current applications
have increasingly been based on Elliptic Curves (ECs) [19, 15]. With Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC), messages and secrets are mapped to points on an
elliptic curve, and specific point doubling and point addition operations define
transitions between points. Scalar point multiplication uses a sequence of point
doubling and point additions to efficiently evaluate point multiplications:
Q = [k]P = P + P + ...+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
.
Cryptosystems based on ECs rely on the difficulty of solving the Elliptic Curve
Discrete Log (ECDL) problem. Namely, given the points Q and P in the pre-
vious equation, it is hard to determine the scalar multiple k for elliptic curves
with points P of large order and large k numbers. However, with the expected
emergence of quantum computers [4] in the near future, cryptosystems that
rely on the ECDL are no longer safe as the scalar multiple can be easily recov-
ered using Shor’s algorithm [27]. Other quantum resilient schemes have been
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proposed. Furthermore, post-quantum cryptosystems such as Supersingular
Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) are slow techniques, and speeding up its elliptic
curve computation is frequently mentioned as a significant goal.
The core operation for ECC is the scalar multiplication [k]P whose compu-
tation speed is seen as key to improving ciphers. For instant, in [11] Eisentrager
et al proposed a method for computing the formula S = (2P + Q). Their
improved procedure saves a field multiplication, when compared to the origi-
nal algorithm. Later, Ciet et al [6] introduced a faster method for computing
the same formula when a field inversion costs more than six field multiplica-
tions. Furthermore, they introduced an efficient method for computing point
tripling. Mixed powers system of point doubling and tripling for computing
the scalar multiplication was represented later by Dimitrov et al [10]. In [20]
Mishra et al presented an efficient quintuple formula (5P) and introduced a
mixed base algorithm with doubling and tripling. Further development was in-
troduced by Longa and Miri [18] by computing an efficient method for tripling
and quintupling mixed with differential addition. They proposed an efficient
multibases non-adjacent representation (mbNAF) to reduce the cost. In [18]
the same authors present further optimization in terms of cost for computing
the form dP + Q. They have succeeded in implementing the previous forms
of mixed double and add algorithm by using a single inversion when applying
a new precomputation scheme. More recently, Purohit and Rawat [25] used a
multibase representation to propose an efficient scalar multiplication algorithm
of doubling, tripling, and septupling, restricted on a non super-singular elliptic
curve defined over the field F2m . In addition, they have compared their work
with other existing algorithms to achieve better representation in terms of cost.
Therefore, speeding up the scalar multiplication computation in parallel with
reducing the cost is a critical task. We present a new methodology to compute
elliptic curve operations with more general forms of the type mP + nQ, where
m and n are small integers, aiming for faster implementation with the lowest
cost among currently known algorithms using only one inversion.
Among all applications based on EC, the highest benefit from our work
concerns the post-quantum cryptosystem, Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Helman
(SIDH). Its main weakness is the slow elliptic curve computation speed. For
other elliptic curve schemes, the computation speed-up also favors attacks,
which can however be compensated by increasing the size of the key. Isogeny-
based cryptography also utilizes points on an elliptic curve, but its security is
instead based on the difficulty of computing isogenies between elliptic curves.
An isogeny can be thought of as a unique algebraic mapping between two el-
liptic curves that satisfy the group law. An algorithm for computing isogenies
on ordinary curves in sub-exponential time was presented by Childs et al [5],
rendering the use of cryptosystems based on isogenies on ordinary curves unsafe
in the presence of quantum computers. However, there is no known algorithm
for computing isogenies on supersingular curves in sub-exponential time.
In [13], Jao and De Feo proposed a key exchange based on isogenies of super-
singular elliptic curves. The proposed scheme resembles the standard Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), but goes a step further by computing isogenies
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over large degrees. In the scenario where Alice and Bob want to exchange a
secret key over an insecure channel, they pick a smooth isogeny prime p of the
form laAl
b
B . f ±1 where lA and lB are small primes, a and b are positive inte-
gers, and f is a small cofactor chosen to make the number prime. These define
a supersingular elliptic curve, E0(Fq) where q = p
2. Lastly, they choose four
points on the curve that form the bases {PA, QA} and {PB , QB}, which act
as generators for E0(l
a
A) and E0(l
b
B), respectively. In a graph of supersingular
isogenies where the vertices represent isomorphic curves and the edges represent
l-degree isogenies, the infeasibility to discover a path that connects two particu-
lar vertices provides the security for this protocol. This led to the Supersingular
Isogeny-based Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (SIDH) [13]. As of today,
the best-known algorithms against the SIDH protocol have an exponential time
complexity for both classical and quantum attackers.
Although the SIDH public key size for achieving a 128-bit security level in
the quantum setting was already reported as small as 564 bytes in [8], this
SIDH public key size was recently further reduced in [7] to just 330 bytes.
However impressive, these key size credentials have to be contrasted against
SIDH’s relatively slow runtime performance. Indeed, the SIDH key exchange
protocol has a latency in the order of milliseconds when implemented in high-
end Intel processors. This timing is significantly higher than the one achieved
by several other quantum-resistant cryptosystem proposals. Consequently, some
recent works have focused on devising strategies to reduce the runtime cost of
the SIDH protocol.
Reportedly Couveignes made the first suggestions towards the usage of isoge-
nies for cryptographic purposes in a seminar held in 1997, later reported in [9].
The first published work of a concrete isogeny-based cryptographic primitive
was presented by Charles, Lauter and Goren in [2, 3], where the authors in-
troduced the hardness of path-finding in supersingular isogeny graphs and its
application to the design of hash functions. It has since been used as an as-
sumption for other cryptographic applications such as key-exchange and digital
signature protocols. Stolbunov studied in [28] the hardness of finding isogenies
between two ordinary elliptic curves defined over a finite field Fq, with q a prime
power. The author proposed to use this setting as the underlying hard prob-
lem for a Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol. Nevertheless, Childs, Jao,
and Soukharev discovered in [5] a subexponential complexity quantum attack
against Stolbunovs scheme.
In 2011, Jao and De Feo proposed the problem of finding the isogeny map
between two supersingular elliptic curves, a setting where the attack in [5] does
not apply anymore. This proposal led to the Supersingular Isogeny-based Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol (SIDH) [13]. As of today, the best-known algo-
rithms against the SIDH protocol have an exponential time complexity for both
classical and quantum attackers.
On the other hand, some recent works have focused on devising strategies
to reduce the runtime cost of the SIDH protocol. For example, Koziel et al.
presented a parallel evaluation of isogenies implemented on an FPGA architec-
ture [16, 17], reporting important speedups for this protocol. These develop-
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ments show the increasing research interest on developing techniques able to
accelerate the SIDH protocol software and hardware implementations. More
recently in [12], several algorithmic optimization targeting both elliptic-curve
and field arithmetic operations have been presented in order to accelerate the
runtime performance of SIDH by enhancing the calculation of the elliptic curve
operation P + k[Q].
The core operations for SIDH is computing the isogeny and its kernel. Ba-
sically, Velus formula is used to compute the isogeny and the P + k[Q] formula
is used to compute the kernel, where P and Q are points on the curve and k
is the secret key that is generated by both of them [13]. This operation must
be performed in both phases of SIDH. First, this happens in the key generation
phase, where the point is known in advance. In this case, one can construct a
look up table that contains all doubles of point Q and reuse any of them when
its needed. Second, in the key exchange phase, where the point Q is variable,
we will apply our mixed-base representation (up to 32) in order to speed up
the calculations, minding that all mixed-base formulas was implemented with a
single inversion.
Montgomery Here is another form of elliptic curve, different from the short
Weierstrass form, which is called Montgomery curve. In 1987, the Montgomery
curve was introduced by Peter L. Montgomery [21]. Such a curve is a set of all
pairs (x,y)∈ Zq which fulfill:
E/Fq : By2 = x3 +Ax2 + x
such that A,B∈ Zq, and with A2 6=4 and B is a non zero value,
The point on an elliptic curve with affine coordinates can be represented in
Montgomery form using projective coordinates P = (X : Z), where x = X/Z
and y = Y/Z for Z 6=0.
For P = (X1 : Z1) and Q = (X2 : Z2), one can compute P + Q and point
2*P by using the following equations, where P 6= Q:
X3 = (Z2 − Z1)((X2 − Z2)(X1 + Z1) + (X2 + Z2)(X1 − Z1))2
Z3 = (X2 −X1)((X2 − Z2)(X1 + Z1)− (X2 + Z2)(X1 − Z1))2
In case of doubling where P = Q:
4X1Z1 = (X1 + Z1)
2 − (X1 − Z1)2
X3 = (X1 + Z1)
2(X1 − Z1)2
Z3 = (4X1Z1)((X1 − Z1)2 − ((A+ 2)/4)(4X1Z1))
4
Weierstrass Elliptic Curve This section represents the equations of the
original work that we compare our algorithm with. We consider elliptic curve
over Zp, where p > 3. Such a curve, in the short Weierstrass form in the affine
plane, is the set of all pairs (x,y)∈ Zp which fulfill:
y2 ≡ x3 + a.x+ b (mod p) (1)
For P = (xP , yP ) and Q = (xQ, yQ), one can compute P + Q by using the
following equations, where λ is represented into two different forms [24].
In case of addition where P 6= Q:
λ =
(
yQ − yP
xQ − xP
)
mod p (2)
xR = λ
2 − xP − xQ mod p
In case of computing 2 ∗ P (doubling of order one) where P has coordinates
(x1, y1):
λ =
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)
mod p (3)
x2 = λ
2 − 2x1 mod p (4)
y2 = λ(x1 − x2)− y1 mod p (5)
Where λ is the slope of the tangent through P, and x2 and y2, the affine
coordinates after doubling P one time. While a two dimensional projective
space can also be used for computations in Weierstrass form, here we focus on
computations in the affine plane.
2 Inverting Multiplications based on Curve Or-
der
Inverting multiplications can be very useful in case the number of 1 bits of the
binary representation of an inversion of the scalar multiplication k is smaller
than the number of 1 bits of the original one. Basically, instead of using the
point P as a base, one traverses the group backward starting from the inversion
of the base point −P .
[k]P = [ordE(P )− k](−P ) = [#E − k](−P )
If #E = 61 and k = 49, the number of 1-bit of the binary representation
of 1210 = (1100)2 is less than the number of 1-bit of 4910 = (110001)2 by one,
directing to a smaller number of differential additions.
According to Hasse’s theorem [24]:
p + 1 − 2√p ≤ #E ≤ p + 1 + 2√p
This is also known as Hasse’s bound, which states that the number of points
on elliptic curves is roughly in the range of the prime p.
5
3 Fast nP +mQ
In this section we introduce step by step the proposed affine computations of the
form nP +mQ. We start with fast one-inversion formula for 2nP (referred to as
doubling of order n, or nth double), before addressing more complex equations.
3.1 Fast 22P
By replacing x1, y1 and x3, y3, and λ in Equations 3, 4 and 5, we find the new
slope and (x4, y4) coordinates for the second double.
λ4 =
3x23 + a
2y3
mod p
λ4 =
3(λ2 − 2x1)2 + a
2(λ(x1 − (λ2 − 2x1))− y1) mod p
λ4 =
3((
3x21+a
2y1
)2 − 2x1)2 + a
2(λ(x1 − (λ2 − 2x1))− y1) mod p
λ4 =
3((
3x21+a
2y1
)2 − 2x1)2 + a
2x1(
3x21+a
2y1
)− 2( 3x21+a2y1 )3 + 4x1(
3x21+a
2y1
)− 2y1
mod p (6)
In order to get rid of all inverses in Equation 6 we multiply λ4 by
(2y1)
4
(2y1)4
to
eliminate all the denominators of the slope λ, then we get
λ4 =
3((3x21 + a)
2 − 2x1(2y1)2)2 + a(2y1)4
2x1(2y1)3(3x21 + a)− 4y1(3x21 + a)3 + 4x1(2y1)3(3x21 + a)− (2y1)5
mod p
(7)
The denominator is denoted U.
U = 2x1(2y1)
3(3x21 + a)− 4y1(3x21 + a)3 + 4x1(2y1)3(3x21 + a)− (2y1)5
Rewritten as:
U = 2y1(2x1(2y1)
2(3x21 + a)− 2(3x21 + a)3 + 4x1(2y1)2(3x21 + a)− (2y1)4)
Further rewritten as:
U = 2y1q (8)
where,
q = 2x1(2y1)
2(3x21 + a)− 2(3x21 + a)3 + 4x1(2y1)2(3x21 + a)− (2y1)4
Eliminating the inverses speeds up the calculation and increase the efficiency
of the parallelization process between the slope and the coordinates equations.
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For simplicity, let’s consider,
λ4 =
W
U
mod p (9)
Then we substitute Equation 9 in the x4 and y4 equations,
x4 = λ
2
4 − 2x3 mod p
x4 = λ
2
4 − 2(λ2 − 2x1) mod p
x4 = λ
2
4 − 2λ2 + 4x1 mod p (10)
x4 =
(
W
U
)2
− 2
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)2
+ 4x1 mod p (11)
Eliminating the inverses in Equation 11 by multiplying with the value of U2
where we remind from Equation 8 that,
U = (2y1) q
Then we get,
U2 x4 = W
2 − 2q2(3x21 + a)2 + 4x1U2 mod p
x4 =
W 2 − 2q2(3x21 + a)2 + 4x1U2
U2
mod p (12)
Same steps will be applied in order to find and simplify y4
y4 = λ4(x3 − x4)− y3 mod p
y4 = λ4((λ
2 − 2x1)− x4)− (λ(x1 − (λ2 − 2x1))− y1) mod p
y4 = λ4λ
2 − 2x1λ4 − x4λ4 − x1λ+ λ3 − 2x1λ+ y1 mod p
Considering,
x4 =
Nx
U2
mod p (13)
y4 =
W
U
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)2 − 2x1W
U
− x4W
U
− x1(3x
2
1 + a
2y1
) + (
3x21 + a
2y1
)3 − 2x1(3x
2
1 + a
2y1
) + y1
Then we multiply y4 by U
3
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U3 y4 = Wq
2(3x21 + a)
2 − 2x1WU2 − NxW − x1U2q(3x21 + a) + q3(3x21 +
a)3 − 2x1U2q(3x21 + a) + y1U3
y4 =
Ny
U3
mod p (14)
As it can be noted in Equations 9, 13, and 14, the denominators of x4 and
y4 are multiples of the λ4 denominator. Therefore, one can implement the
second double with only one inverse, unlike the original equations that involve
two inverses in order to compute the second double of a point on a curve.
Furthermore, finding the λ4 value is not required anymore.
3.2 Fast 23P
By applying the same steps that were followed in finding the second double, one
can find the third double. First, employing the x4, y4, and λ4 in Equations 3, 4,
and 5 respectively.
λ8 =
3x24 + a
2y4
mod p
λ8 =
3(λ24 − 2(( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)2 − 2x1))2 + a
2(λ4(((
3x21+a
2y1
)2 − 2x1)− x4)− (( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)(x1 − (( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)2 − 2x1))− y1))
mod p
For simplification we rewrite this as:
λ8 =
W8
U8
mod p (15)
W8 = 3((
W
U )
2 − 2(( 3x21+a2y1 )2 − 2x1))2 + a
U8 = 2(λ4(((
3x21+a
2y1
)2 − 2x1)− x4)− (( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)(x1 − (( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)2 − 2x1))− y1))
U8 = 2(λ4(((
3x21+a
2y1
)2 − 2x1) − (λ24 − 2(( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)2 − 2x1))) − (( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)(x1 −
((
3x21+a
2y1
)2 − 2x1))− y1))
U8 = 2λ4(
3x21+a
2y1
)2 − 4x1λ4 − 2λ34 + 4λ4( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)2 − 8x1λ4 − 2x1( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
) +
2(
3x21+a
2y1
)3 − 4x1( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
) + 2y1
U8 = 6(
W
U )(
3x21+a
2y1
)2 − 12x1(WU )− 6x1( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)− 2(WU )3 + 2( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)3 + 2y1
λ8 =
3((WU )
2 − 2(( 3x21+a2y1 )2 − 2x1))2 + a
6(WU )(
3x21+a
2y1
)2 − 12x1(WU )− 6x1(
3x21+a
2y1
)− 2(WU )3 + 2(
3x21+a
2y1
)3 + 2y1
mod p
8
In order to eliminate all the inverses in the equation for λ8, that are in λ
and λ4, we multiply λ8 by
U4
U4 , where,
U8 = (2y1)Uq8 mod p (16)
W8 = 3(W
2 − 2q2(3x21 + a)2 + 4x1U2)2 + aU4 mod p
U8 = 6W (2y1)q
3(3x21 + a)
2 − 12x1WU3 − 6x1(2y1)3q4(3x21 + a) − 2W 3U +
2(2y1)q
4(3x21 + a)
3 + (2y1)U
4 mod p
Now, we reformulate the U8 equation to maintain the form of the Equa-
tion 16. Thus, we have to multiply λ8 (i.e.,
W8
U8
), by 2y12y1 then take out (2y1)U
as a common factor of U8. This way we can easily eliminate all inverses in x8
and y8.
W8 = (2y1)(3(W
2 − 2q2(3x21 + a)2 + 4x1U2)2 + aU4) mod p
U8 = (2y1)(6W (2y1)q
3(3x21+a)
2−12x1WU3−6x1(2y1)3q4(3x21+a)−2W 3U+
2(2y1)q
4(3x21 + a)
3 + (2y1)U
4) mod p
U8 = (2y1)U(6Wq
2(3x21 + a)
2 − 12x1WU2 − 6x1(2y1)2q3(3x21 + a)− 2W 3 +
2q3(3x21 + a)
3 + (2y1)U
3) mod p
where,
q8 = 6Wq
2(3x21 +a)
2−12x1WU2−6x1(2y1)2q3(3x21 +a)−2W 3 + 2q3(3x21 +
a)3 + (2y1)U
3 mod p
To compute x8 and y8, substitute Equation 15 with the new values of W8
and U8 in the x8 and y8 equations,
x8 = λ
2
8 − 2x4 mod p
x8 = λ
2
8 − 2(λ24 − 2(λ2 − 2x1)) mod p
x8 = λ
2
8 − 2(λ24 − 2λ2 + 4x1) mod p
x8 = λ
2
8 − 2λ24 + 4λ2 − 8x1 mod p (17)
x8 = (
W8
U8
)2 − 2(W
U
)2 + 4(
3x21 + a
2y1
)2 − 8x1 mod p
Multiply both sides by U28 by considering the value of U8 in 16 to eliminate
all inverses,
U28 x8 = W
2
8 − 2W 2(2y1)2q28 + 4(3x21 + a)2U2q28 − 8x1U28 mod p
x8 =
W 28 − 2W 2(2y1)2q28 + 4(3x21 + a)2U2q28 − 8x1U28
U28
mod p (18)
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Same steps will be applied in order to find and simplify y8,
y8 = λ8(x4 − x8)− y4 mod p
y8 = λ8((λ
2
4 − 2(λ2 − 2x1)) − x8) − λ4((λ2 − 2x1) − (λ24 − 2(λ2 − 2x1))) +
(λ(x1 − (λ2 − 2x1))− y1) mod p
y8 = λ8(λ
2
4− 2λ2 + 4x1− x8)− (λ4λ2− 2x1λ4− x4λ4) + (λx1− λ3 + 2x1λ−
y1) mod p
y8 = λ8λ
2
4−2λ8λ2+4x1λ8−x8λ8−λ4λ2+2x1λ4+x4λ4+λx1−λ3+2x1λ−y1 mod p
(19)
Similarly to the decomposition x4 =
Nx
U2
, we consider x8 =
Nx8
U28
y8 =
W8
U8
(WU )
2 − 2W8U8 (
3x21+a
2y1
)2 + 4x1
W8
U8
− Nx8
U28
W8
U8
− WU ( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)2 + 2x1
W
U +
Nx
U2
W
U + x1(
3x21+a
2y1
)− ( 3x21+a2y1 )3 + 2x1(
3x21+a
2y1
)− y1 mod p
Multiplying both sides by U38 ,
U38 y8 = W8W
2(2y1)
2q28−2W8(3x21+a)2U2q28+4x1W8U28−Nx8W8−W (3x21+
a)2U8Uq
2
8 + 2x1WU
2
8 (2y1)q8 +NxW (2y1)
3q38 +x1U
2
8Uq8(3x
2
1 + a)−U3q38(3x21 +
a)3 + 2x1U
2
8Uq8(3x
2
1 + a)− y1U38 mod p
y8 =
Ny8
U38
mod p (20)
As it can be observed, this proves that one can compute the third double of
a node on elliptic curve with only one inverse as we have done for the second
double.
3.3 Fast 24P
By expanding values x8, y8, and λ8 in the λ16 equation, we find the new slope
for the fourth double. Then, we apply the same steps that were followed in the
previous sections.
λ16 =
3x28 + a
2y8
mod p
Considering,
λ16 =
W16
U16
mod p (21)
where,
U16 = (2y1)U8Uq16 mod p (22)
Referring to the Equation 17 for x8 value,
W16 = 3(λ
2
8 − 2λ24 + 4λ2 − 8x1)2 + a mod p
W16 = 3((
W8
U8
)2 − 2(WU )2 + 4( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)2 − 8x1)2 + a mod p
10
Referring to Equations 10, 17, and 19 for the values of x4, x8, and y8 respec-
tively, we get,
U16 = 2(λ8λ
2
4 − 2λ8λ2 + 4x1λ8 − x8λ8 − λ4λ2 + 2x1λ4 + x4λ4 + λx1 − λ3 +
2x1λ− y1) mod p
U16 = 2(λ8λ
2
4− 2λ8λ2 + 4x1λ8− (λ28− 2λ24 + 4λ2− 8x1)λ8− λ4λ2 + 2x1λ4 +
(λ24 − 2λ2 + 4x1)λ4 + λx1 − λ3 + 2x1λ− y1) mod p
U16 = 6λ8λ
2
4−12λ2λ8 +24x1λ8−2λ38−6λ4λ2 +12x1λ4 +2λ34 +6x1λ−2λ3−
2y1 mod p
U16 = 6(
W8
U8
)(WU )
2−12( 3x21+a2y1 )2(W8U8 )+24x1(W8U8 )−2(W8U8 )3−6(WU )(
3x21+a
2y1
)2+
12x1(
W
U ) + 2(
W
U )
3 + 6x1(
3x21+a
2y1
)− 2( 3x21+a2y1 )3 − 2y1 mod p
In order to eliminate all the inverses in the equation λ16 that are part of λ, λ4,
and λ8 we multiply λ8 by
U48
U48
, while considering the value of U8 in Equation 16.
W16 = 3(W
2
8 − 2W 2(2y1)2q28 + 4U2q28(3x21 + a)2 − 8x1U28 )2 + aU48 mod p
U16 = 6W8W
2(2y1)
2q28U8−12(3x21 +a)2W8q28U2U8 + 24x1W8U38 −2W 38U8−
6W (3x21+a)
2q28UU
2
8 +12x1W (2y1)q8U
3
8 +2W
3(2y1)
3q38U8+6x1(3x
2
1+a)q8UU
3
8−
2(3x21 + a)
3q38U
3U8 − 2y1U48 mod p
Now, we reformulate the equation of U16 to maintain the form of Equation 16.
Thus, we have to multiply λ16 (W16,U16), by
(2y1)U
(2y1)U
then take out (2y1)UU8 as a
common factor of U16. This way we can eliminate all inverses from the equations
for computing x16 and y16.
W16 = (2y1)U(3(W
2
8−2W 2(2y1)2q28+4U2q28(3x21+a)2−8x1U28 )2+aU48 ) mod p
U16 = (2y1)U(6W8W
2(2y1)
2q28U8 − 12(3x21 + a)2W8q28U2U8 + 24x1W8U38 −
2W 38U8−6W (3x21+a)2q28UU28 +12x1W (2y1)q8U38 +2W 3(2y1)3q38U8+6x1(3x21+
a)q8UU
3
8 − 2(3x21 + a)3q38U3U8 − 2y1U48 ) mod p
U16 = (2y1)UU8(6W8W
2(2y1)
2q28−12(3x21+a)2W8q28U2+24x1W8U28−2W 38−
6W (3x21 + a)
2q28UU8 + 12x1W (2y1)q8U
2
8 + 2W
3(2y1)
3q38 + 6x1(3x
2
1 + a)q8UU
2
8 −
2(3x21 + a)
3q38U
3 − 2y1U38 ) mod p
Thus one finds λ16 with a single inverse, unlike the original method that
requires 4 inverses in order to compute the fourth double slope. Likewise, we
prove in the following equations that we can find x16 and y16 with a multiplier
denominator of λ16. As a result, there is no need to calculate their inverses as
we have proven before.
x16 = λ
2
16 − 2x8 mod p
x16 = λ
2
16 − 2(λ28 − 2(λ24 − 2(λ2 − 2x1))) mod p
x16 = λ
2
16 − 2(λ28 − 2(λ24 − 2λ2 + 4x1)) mod p
x16 = λ
2
16 − 2(λ28 − 2λ24 + 4λ2 − 8x1) mod p
x16 = λ
2
16 − 2λ28 + 4λ24 − 8λ2 + 16x1 mod p
11
x16 = (
W16
U16
)2 − 2(W8
U8
)2 + 4(
W
U
)2 − 8(3x
2
1 + a
2y1
)2 + 16x1 mod p
In order to eliminate the inverses in the equation of x16, we multiply both
sides by U216, using the value of U16 in Equation 22,
U216 x16 = W
2
16 − 2W 28 (2y1)2U2q216+
4W 2(2y1)
2U28 q
2
16 − 8(3x21 + a)2U28U2q216 + 16x1U216 mod p
x16 =
W 216 − 2W 28 (2y1)2U2q216 + 4W 2(2y1)2U28 q216 − 8(3x21 + a)2U28U2q216 + 16x1U216
U216
mod p (23)
Likewise, finding y16,
y16 = λ16(x8 − x16)− y8 mod p
Based on the decomposition of x8 as
Nx8
U28
, given that y8 =
Ny8
U38
, and rewriting
x16 as
Nx16
U216
, we substitute with these values in the previous equation to find
y16.
y16 =
W16
U16
(
Nx8
U28
− Nx16
U216
)− Ny8
U38
mod p
Multiplying both sides by U316, to eliminate all inverses as we have done
previously with considering the value of U16 in Equation 22,
U316 y16 = W16Nx8(2y1)
2U2q216 −W16Nx16 −Ny8(2y1)3U3q316 mod p
y16 =
W16Nx8(2y1)
2U2q216 −W16Nx16 −Ny8(2y1)3U3q316
U316
mod p (24)
3.4 Fast 3P (Point Tripling)
As it is important to calculate the binary multiplicative 2n for points Q to
compute a large degree isogeny, we enhance the algorithm by finding the inter-
mediate steps like 3Q, 5Q, and 7Q etc.
In [26] Subramanya Rao have worked on Montgomery curves and found an
efficient technique to find point tripling. Simply, we will optimize an application
of a single double to some point Q then perform a point addition. This technique
could be applied to all intermediate steps as follows.
Substitute the Equation 3 of the value of λ in Equations 4 and 5.
x2 = (
3x21 + a
2y1
)2 − 2x1 mod p
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y2 = (
3x21 + a
2y1
)(x1 − x2)− y1 mod p
Then, we substitute the value of x3 and y3 in the slope of point addition as
a value of 2Q.
λ′3 =
y′2 − y′1
x′2 − x′1
mod p
Getting
λ′3 =
((
3x21+a
2y1
)(x1 − x3)− y1)− y1
((
3x21+a
2y1
)2 − 2x1)− x1
mod p
λ′3 =
(
3x21+a
2y1
)(x1 − ( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)2 + 2x1)− 2y1
((
3x21+a
2y1
)2 − 2x1)− x1
mod p
λ′3 =
(
3x21+a
2y1
)(3x1 − ( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)2)− 2y1
(
3x21+a
2y1
)2 − 3x1
mod p
Multiplying λ′3 with (
2y1
2y1
)3 to eliminate all inverses and to be able to take
out 2y1 as a common factor from the denominator to reduce the x2 fraction
which is the x-coordinate of the point doubling.
λ′3 =
(3x21 + a)(3x1(2y1)
2 − (3x21 + a)2)− (2y1)4
(2y1)((3x21 + a)
2 − 3x1(2y1)2) mod p (25)
Rewriting,
λ′3 =
W3
U3
mod p (26)
Where,
U3 = (2y1)q3 mod p (27)
Now we substitute with the value of the new slope in Equation 26 to compute
3Q.
x3 = λ
′2
3 − x1 − x2 mod p
x3 = (
W3
U3
)2 − x1 − (3x
2
1 + a
2y1
)2 + 2x1 mod p
Multiplying the equation with U23
U23 x3 = W
2
3 + x1U
2
3 − q23(3x21 + a)2 mod p
13
x3 =
W 23 + x1U
2
3 − q23(3x21 + a)2
U23
mod p (28)
Considering,
x3 =
Nx3
U23
mod p (29)
Now we find y3,
y3 = λ
′
3(x1 − x3)− y1 mod p
y3 =
W3
U3
(x1 − Nx3
U23
)− y1 mod p
Multiplying with U33 to eliminate the inverses,
U33 y3 = W3(x1U
2
3 −Nx3)− y1U33 mod p
y3 =
W3(x1U
2
3 −Nx3)− y1U33
U33
mod p (30)
3.5 Fast 2nQ+ P
As we have mentioned earlier, the complexity of the SIDH cryptosystem relies
on computing isogenies between points on the elliptic curve. Thus, we have
performed a further optimization in term of the kernel Equation P + [k]Q. As
we have succeeded to perform an advanced exponent of a point on a curve
with a single inverse, it would have been needed to compute an extra inverse
for a differential point addition. Therefore, in this section we introduce an
optimization for mixing our advanced doubling equations with the addition and
perform it with a single inverse.
In the point tripling section we computed the 3P as an intermediate step.
Here, we provide general equations that can be applied to any of our equations
4Q, 8Q, and 16Q and their extensions.
The following equations have some variables like Nx, Ny, and U that have to
be replaced with the variables that related to each double. We have represented
here the equation P + 4Q.
We substitute the value of x and y coordinates of the second double of the
point Q in equations 13 and 14 respectively in the addition slope equation in 2.
λ5 =
Ny
U3 − y1
Nx
U2 − x1
mod p
Multiplying with U3 to eliminate the inverses,
λ5 =
Ny − y1U3
NxU − x1U3 mod p (31)
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Substitute λ in the equations for x5 and y5,
x5 = (
Ny − y1U3
NxU − x1U3 )
2 − x1 − Nx
U2
mod p
Take out a common factor U of the λ denominator and multiply the equation
with U2(Nx − x1U2)2,
U2(Nx − x1U2)2 x3 = (Ny − y1U3)2 − x1U2(Nx − x1U2)2 −Nx(Nx − x1U2)2 mod p
x3 =
(Ny − y1U3)2 − x1U2(Nx − x1U2)2 −Nx(Nx − x1U2)2
U2(Nx − x1U2)2 mod p (32)
Now we find y3,
y5 =
Ny − y1U3
U(Nx − x1U2)x1 −
Ny − y1U3
U(Nx − x1U2)x3 − y1 mod p
Multiplying with U2(Nx−x1U2)2 one eliminates all inverses and adjusts the
y3 denominator to be matched to x5 for simplification,
U2(Nx − x1U2)2 y3 = U(Nx − x1U2)((Ny − y1U3)x1 − (Ny − y1U3)x3 − U(Nx − x1U2)y1)
y5 =
U(Nx − x1U2)((Ny − y1U3)x1 − (Ny − y1U3)x3 − U(Nx − x1U2)y1)
U2(Nx − x1U2)2 mod p
(33)
3.6 Fast 2nP + 2Q
In Section 3.4 we have illustrate the importance of computing the intermediate
equations for the overall speed-up of our algorithms. The 2nP + 2Q form,
where 1 < n < 5, will be efficient in computing the points 6Q, 10Q, and 18Q
and since the subtraction in elliptic curve could be represented by adding the
inverse of a point, 14Q can be performed efficiently by using this algorithm as
well. In this section, we will exemplify implementing the form of 22P+2Q=(6Q),
where P = Q.
We substitute the value of x and y coordinates of the 4Q algorithm of the
point Q in equations 13 and 14 respectively and the 2Q algorithm coordinates
in Equations 4 and 5 as well in the addition slope Equation 2.
λ6 =
Nyn
U3 − ( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)(x1 − ( 3x
2
1+a
2y1
)2 + 2x1) + y1
Nx
U2 − (
3x21+a
2y1
)2 + 2x1
mod p
Multiplying with U3 to eliminate the inverses by considering the value of U
in Equation 8,
λ6 =
Nyn − q3(3x21 + a)(x1(2y1)2 − (3x21 + a)2 + 2x1(2y1)2) + y1U3
NxnU − 2y1q3(3x21 + a)2 + 2x1(2y1)(2y1)2q3
mod p
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λ6 =
Nyn − q3(3x21 + a)(x1(2y1)2 − (3x21 + a)2 + 2x1(2y1)2) + y1U3
NxnU − 2y1q3(3x21 + a)2 + 2x1(2y1)(2y1)2q3
mod p
Since U = 2y1q, we take a common factor U from the denominator then multiply
both the numerator and denominator with 2y1, in order to be able to eliminate
all inverses in the coordinates equations,
λ6 =
2y1(Ny − q3(3x21 + a)(x1(2y1)2 − (3x21 + a)2 + 2x1(2y1)2) + y1U3)
2y1U(Nxn − q2((3x21 + a)2 + 2x1(2y1)2))
mod p
Considering,
λ6 =
W6
U6
mod p (34)
Where,
U6 = (2y1)Uq6 mod p (35)
Now we substitute with the value of new slope in x and y coordinate equations
to compute 6Q,
x6 = λ
2
6 − x3 − x4 mod p
x6 = (
W6
U6
)2 − (3x
2
1 + a
2y1
)2 + 2x1 − Nx
n
U2
mod p
Multiplying the equation with U26
U26 x6 = W
2
6 − U2q26(3x21 + a)2 + 2x1U26 − (2y1)2q26Nxn mod p
x6 =
W 26 − U2q26(3x21 + a)2 + 2x1U26 − (2y1)2q26Nxn
U26
mod p (36)
Now we find y6,
y6 = λ6(x3 − x6)− y3 mod p
Substituting the value of y3, x3 and x6 by considering,
x6 =
Nx6
U26
y6 =
W6
U6
((
3x21 + a
2y1
)2 − 2x1 − Nx6
U26
)− (3x
2
1 + a
2y1
)(x1 − (3x
2
1 + a
2y1
)2 + 2x1) + y1 mod p
y6 =
W6
U6
((
3x21 + a
2y1
)2 − 2x1 − Nx6
U26
)− (3x
2
1 + a
2y1
)(3x1 − (3x
2
1 + a
2y1
)2) + y1 mod p
Multiplying the equation with U36 to eliminate the inverses,
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U36 y6 = W6(U
2q26(3x
2
1 + a)
2 − 2x1U26 − Nx6) − Uq6(3x21 + a)(3x1U26 −
U2q26(3x
2
1 + a)
2) + y1U
3
6 mod p
y3 =
Ny6
U36
mod p (37)
Note: In case of n = 3 or 4, Nxn , Nyn and Un will be replaced with the
values that related to each algorithm. For the variable q, it will be replaced
with Uq8 and UU8q16 in case of computing 8P + 2Q and 16P + 2Q respectively.
3.7 2nP + mQ
We have succeeded in representing this algorithms for some integers n and m, in
one implementation with some replaceable variables, Nyn , Nxn , and Un based
on the n value, where (1 < n < 5) and (2 < m < 17). As we have described
in the previous sections, each algorithm computes these variables differently.
Thus, generalizing the equations benefits hardware optimization, flexibility and
allows parallelization to be applied intensively. In this section, we illustrate the
case of 23P + 3Q = (11Q), where P = Q.
We substitute the value of the coordinates x and y of the 8P, 3P algorithms
of the point P from Sections 3.2, and 3.4 respectively in the addition slope
Equation 2.
λ11 =
Ny8
U38
− Ny3
U33
Nx8
U28
− Nx3
U23
mod p
Multiplying the numerator and denominator with U38U
3
3 to eliminate the
inverses,
λ11 =
Ny8U
3
3 −Ny3U38
Nx8U33U8 −Nx3U38U3
mod p
Take out a common factor U8U3 of the denominator,
λ11 =
Ny8U
3
3 −Ny3U38
U3U8(Nx8U23 −Nx3U28 )
mod p
Considering,
λ11 =
W11
U11
mod p (38)
where,
U11 = U3U8q11 mod p (39)
Now we substitute with the value of new slope in x and y coordinate equations
to compute 11Q,
x11 = λ
2
11 − x3 − x8 mod p
17
x11 = (
W11
U11
)2 − Nx3
U23
− Nx8
U28
mod p
Multiplying the equation with U211,
U211 x11 = W
2
11 −Nx3U28 q211 −Nx8U23 q211 mod p
x11 =
W 211 −Nx3U28 q211 −Nx8U23 q211
U211
mod p (40)
where,
x11 =
Nx11
U211
mod p (41)
Now we find y11,
y11 = λ11(x3 − x11)− y3 mod p
Substitute the value of y3, x3 and x11,
y11 =
W11
U11
(
Nx3
U23
− Nx11
U211
)
− Ny3
U33
mod p
Multiplying the equation with U311,
U311 y11 = W11(Nx3U
2
8 q
2
11 −Nx11)−Ny3U38 q311 mod p
y11 =
W11(Nx3U
2
8 q
2
11 −Nx11)−Ny3U38 q311
U311
mod p (42)
3.8 Generalizing 2nP +Q and 2nP +mQ Forms
We notice that by reforming the equations in Section 3.5, we can generalize the
two forms 2nP +Q and 2nP +mQ.
As done in Section 3.5, we substitute the value of x and y coordinates of
the second double of the point Q in Equations 13 and 14 respectively in the
addition slope Equation 2.
λ =
Ny
U3 − y1
Nx
U2 − x1
mod p
Multiplying with U3 to eliminate the inverses, yields
λ =
Ny − y1U3
NxU − x1U3 mod p (43)
Considering,
λg =
Wg
Ug
mod p (44)
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Substituting λ in the equations for xg and yg,
xg = (
Wg
Ug
)2 − x1 − Nx
U2
mod p
Multiplying this equation with U2g where,
Ug = Uqg mod p (45)
U2g xg = W
2
g − x1U2g −Nxq2g mod p
xg =
W 2g − x1U2g −Nxq2g
U2g
mod p (46)
Considering,
xg =
Nxg
U2g
mod p (47)
Now we find yg,
yg =
Wg
Ug
(x1 − Nxg
U2g
)− y1 mod p
Multiplying the equation with U2g in order to eliminate all inverses,
U3g yg = Wg(x1U
2
g −Nxg)− y1U3g mod p
yg =
Wg(x1U
2
g −Nxg)− y1U3g
U3g
mod p (48)
The previous equations have variables Nxg, Nyg, Ug’s and Wg’s that have to
be replaced with the variables that related to the corresponding double. Addi-
tionally, as we have seen in Equations 32 and 40 of coordinate x, the terms x1U
2
g ,
and Nxq
2
g have to be replaced with NxiU
2
j q
2
i+j , and NxjU
2
i q
2
i+j respectively in
case we use the 2nP +mQ form. As well as in the equation of coordinate y, we
replace the terms x1U
2
g , and y1U
3
g respectively with NxiU
2
j q
2
i+j , and NyiU
3
j q
3
i+j .
Knowingly, we have succeeded to generalize these two forms with replacing some
variables and terms, leading to a potential optimization in terms of hardware.
3.9 Another Implementation of 6Q
In Section 3.6, we have illustrate that we can compute 6Q through the form of
22P + 2Q. In this section, we provide a different algorithm for computing 6Q
by doubling the point 3Q which has been discussed in Section 3.4. Diversity in
implementations provides us with a greater chance of comparison in terms of
hardware versus speed.
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Since it’s a doubling operation, we substitute the value of x and y coordinates
that has been successfully computed in Section 3.4 in the slope Equation 3,
λ6 =
(
3x23 + a
2y3
)
mod p
λ6 =
3(
W 23+x1U
2
3−q23(3x21+a)2
U23
)2 + a
2(
U3W3(x1−x3)−y1U23
U23
)
mod p
Substituting the x3 value in the y3,
λ6 =
3(
W 23+x1U
2
3−q23(3x21+a)2
U23
)2 + a
2(
U3W3x1−W3(W
2
3 +x1U
2
3−q23(3x21+a)2
U3
)−y1U23
U23
)
mod p
Multiplying with
U43
U43
,
λ6 =
3(W 23 + x1U
2
3 − q23(3x21 + a)2)2 + aU43
2U33W3x1 − 2U3W3(W 23 + x1U23 − q23(3x21 + a)2)− 2y1U43
mod p
Take out a common factor U3 of the denominator in order to eliminate the x
and y inverses in the new coordinates equations,
λ6 =
3(W 23 + x1U
2
3 − q23(3x21 + a)2)2 + aU43
U3(2U23W3x1 − 2W3(W 23 + x1U23 − q23(3x21 + a)2)− 2y1U33 )
mod p
Considering,
λ6 =
W6
U6
mod p (49)
where,
U6 = U3q6 mod p (50)
Now we substitute the value of λ6 in Equation 49 with considering the value of
U6 in Equation 50 when we eliminate the inverses,
x6 = λ
2
6 − 2x3 mod p
x6 =
(
W6
U6
)2
− 2
(
W 23 + x1U
2
3 − q23(3x21 + a)2
U23
)
mod p
Multiplying the equation with U26 ,
U26 x6 = W
2
6 − 2q26(W 23 + x1U23 − q23(3x21 + a)2) mod p
x6 =
W 26 − 2q26(W 23 + x1U23 − q23(3x21 + a)2)
U26
mod p (51)
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Now we find y6,
y6 = λ6(x3 − x6)− y3 mod p
Substituting the value of y3, x3 and x6,
y6 =
W6
U6
(
W 23+x1U
2
3−q23(3x21+a)2
U23
−W 26−2q26(W 23+x1U23−q23(3x21+a)2)
U26
)−U3W3(x1−x3)−y1U23
U23
mod p
Multiplying the equation with U46 ,
U46 y6 = W6U6(q
2
6(W
2
3 + x1U
2
3 − q23(3x21 + a)2) − (W 26 − 2q26(W 23 + x1U23 −
q23(3x
2
1 + a)
2)))− U23 q46(U3W3(x1 − x3)− y1U23 ) mod p
U46 y6 = W6U6(q
2
6W
2
3 +x1U
2
3 q
2
6− q26q23(3x21 +a)2−W 26 + 2q26W 23 + 2q26x1U23 −
2q26q
2
3(3x
2
1 + a)
2)− U23 q46(U3W3(x1 − x3)− y1U23 ) mod p
U46 y6 = W6U6(3q
2
6W
2
3 +3x1U
2
3 q
2
6−3q26q23(3x21+a)2−W 26 )−U23 q46(U3W3(x1−
x3)− y1U23 ) mod p
Substituting x3 value in equation 28,
U46 y6 = W6U6(3q
2
6W
2
3 +3x1U
2
3 q
2
6−3q26q23(3x21+a)2−W 26 )−U23 q46(U3W3(x1−
W 23+x1U
2
3−q23(3x21+a)2
U23
)− y1U23 ) mod p
U46 y6 = W6U6(3q
2
6W
2
3 +3x1U
2
3 q
2
6−3q26q23(3x21+a)2−W 26 )−U3q46(W3(U23x1−
W 23 − x1U23 + q23(3x21 + a)2)− y1U33 ) mod p
U46 y6 = W6U6(3q
2
6W
2
3 +3x1U
2
3 q
2
6−3q26q23(3x21+a)2−W 26 )−U3q46(W3q23(3x21+
a)2 −W 33 − y1U33 ) mod p
y6 =
Nx6
U46
mod p (52)
3.10 Another Implementation of 10Q
Here is another example of different implementation of 10Q that was computed
previously in Section 3.6 through 23+2Q form. In this section, we will implement
10Q by doubling the point 5Q which were computed previously by applying a
differential addition to the algorithm 4Q in Section 3.1. We have succeeded to
prove that we can compute 10Q with a single inverse as well.
As we have done in the previous section, we will substitute the x5 and y5
coordinates to the doubling slope in Equation 3,
λ10 =
(
3x25 + a
2y5
)
mod p
λ10 =
3(
(Ny−y1U3)2−x1U2(Nx−x1U2)2−Nx(Nx−x1U2)2
U2(Nx−x1U2)2 )
2 + a
2(
U(Nx−x1U2)((Ny−y1U3)x1−(Ny−y1U3)x5−U(Nx−x1U2)y1)
U2(Nx−x1U2)2 )
mod p
Multiplying with U
4(Nx−x1U2)4
U4(Nx−x1U2)4
λ10 =
3((Ny − y1U3)2 − x1U2(Nx − x1U2)2 −Nx(Nx − x1U2)2)2 + aU4(Nx − x1U2)4
2U3(Nx − x1U2)3((Ny − y1U3)x1 − (Ny − y1U3)x5 − U(Nx − x1U2)y1) mod p
21
Reforming x5 as,
x5 =
Nx5
U2(Nx − x1U2)2 mod p
Then, substitute x5 in the slope equation,
λ10 =
3((Ny−y1U3)2−x1U2(Nx−x1U2)2−Nx(Nx−x1U2)2)2+aU4(Nx−x1U2)4
2x1U3(Nx−x1U2)3(Ny−y1U3)−2U(Nx−x1U2)(Ny−y1U3)Nx5−2U4(Nx−x1U2)4y1) mod p
Take out a common factor U(Nx − x1U2) of the denominator,
λ10 =
3((Ny−y1U3)2−x1U2(Nx−x1U2)2−Nx(Nx−x1U2)2)2+aU4(Nx−x1U2)4
U(Nx−x1U2)(2x1U2(Nx−x1U2)2(Ny−y1U3)−2Nx5(Ny−y1U3)−2y1U3(Nx−x1U2)3) mod p
Considering,
λ10 =
W10
U10
mod p (53)
Where,
U10 = U(Nx − x1U2)q10 mod p (54)
Now we substitute λ10 in x and y coordinates equations,
x10 = λ
2
10 − 2x5 mod p
x10 =
(
W10
U10
)2
− 2
(
Nx5
U2(Nx − x1U2)2
)
mod p
Multiplying the equation with U210,
U210 x10 = W
2
10 − 2q210Nx5 mod p
x10 =
W 210 − 2q210Nx5
U210
mod p (55)
Now we find y10,
y10 = λ10(x5 − x10)− y5 mod p
y10 =
W10
U10
(
Nx5
U2(Nx − x1U2)2 −
W 210 − 2q210Nx5
U210
)
− Ny5
U2(Nx − x1U2)2 mod p
Multiplying the equation with U310,
U310 y10 = W10(Nx5q
2
10 −W 210 + 2q210Nx5)−Ny5q210U10 mod p
y10 =
W10(Nx5q
2
10 −W 210 + 2q210Nx5)−Ny5q210U10
U310
mod p (56)
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3.11 Results
Simulation experiments are performed with a Java implementation of the pro-
posed equations. We have applied the equations on large parameters defined in
the standard curve P-521 from the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST). Table 2 shows the differences in time and operations count between
the new method as compared to the original equations.
As noted in the Table 1, there is a significant improvement in the speed for
our algorithms as compared to the original ones. The improvement achievable
with parallelization can also be observed, together with its scalability for higher
orders multiplication scalars.
Routine Number of Operations Time ms
Mults Divs ALUs Parallel levels
4P Eq. 350/642 291/628 309/634 310/646 0.5/0.9
8P Eq. 405/930 287/909 320/921 313/939 0.6/1.1
16P Eq. 518/1248 289/1220 347/1236 327/1260 0.9/1.6
Table 1: Algorithms Preliminary Measurements.
4 Sample Applications
In Section 3, we have seen how to compute a scalar multiple k for elliptic curve
point, with a single inverse. Furthermore, we succeeded to perform a differential
addition between two points where one of them can be doubled up to 4 times
in one equation with a single inverse, as well. This optimization can therefore
speed up the computation of many applications and algorithms that are based
on Elliptic Curves. In addition, it has the potential to play an important role in
developing post quantum cryptosystems such as SIDH. In this section we clarify
some of these applications to SIDH.
At each stage of the Super Singular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) protocol,
the kernel of an isogeny has to be computed by both Alice and Bob, calculating
the equation P + [k]Q, where P and Q are points on the curve and k is the secret
key that is generated by both of them [13]. This operation must be performed
in both phases of SIDH. In the first key generation phase, the point is known
in advance. In this case, one can construct a look up table that contains all
doubles of point Q and reuse any of them as needed.
As shown in Section 3, the direct equations for finding a higher doubling
order avoids the original steps. Furthermore, our implementation has proved
that the new equations are faster than the original ones, as described in Sec-
tion 3.11. The introduced optimization speeds up the elliptic curve computation
and is beneficial for SIDH’s quantum security margin. The new equations can
be applied to the right-to-left fast exponentiation algorithm for binary elliptic
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curves [14, 22], also used accordingly for Montgomery curves [23, 12]. In addi-
tion, it can also be applied to the left-to-right fast Double-and-Add or Double-
Add-&-Subtract algorithms. We modify these algorithms in order to exploit the
new equations.
5 Algorithms Overview
This section introduces new algorithms for computing P+[k]Q. The Three-point
ladder algorithm (left-to-right or Double-and-Add) [13], is shown in Figure 1.
The example, uses the same scalar the author assumed, which is 12. In order
to apply the new equations, one can first compute the tripling equations, then
input the result to the 2rd double equation. On the other hand, expanding
on the right-to-left fast multiplication algorithm, one computes the 2nd double,
then further applies a single double to the result, and have the results summed.
Thus, the right-to-left algorithm is slower than the reverse in this case since it
needs three steps while left-to-right algorithm needs two.
In addition, both algorithms use two accumulators to have intermediary
results added to the third accumulator which stores the expected output. In
contrast, our equations can shorten most of the steps the processor consumes
in calculating the final result by using a single accumulator.
Figure 1: Three point ladder (left-to-right) [13, 12].
The right-to-left algorithm [12, 14, 22, 12] in Figure 2 lets the processor
calculate the double at each step, regardless of the value of the secret key bit.
With the new equations to compute repeated doubles, one no longer needs to
double at every step, enabling the development of more efficient algorithms
introduced in the next section.
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Figure 2: Right-to-left algorithm [12].
6 Fast Multiplication with Mixed Base Multi-
plicands
Here follows the description of a few algorithms that can integrate the fast
repeated doubling techniques mentioned so far by applying mixed base multi-
plicands. With the algorithm mP + nQ one can compute multiplications with
scalars up to 31. One can divide m’s binary representation into blocks of five
bits. In case an obtained block represents one of the unimplemented scalar
multiplications, such blocks may be reduced in length.
Figure 3: Data-dependency graph for calculating a single double merged with
another one (Parallelization characteristic).
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6.1 Right-to-left Extensions
The right-to-left algorithm computes the k[Q] by scanning the bits of the scalar
k from right to left. It accelerates the computation in the SIDH key generation
phase while the left-to-right algorithm increases efficiency in the key exchange
phase [12].
Here we present an improved right-to-left algorithm that computes more
efficiently the kernel of isogenies P + [k]Q in both phases. Unlike the Three
ladder and right-to-left algorithms, this algorithm scans till it finds the first 1
bit of the secret key k, then starts its main loop. Once a 1 bit is located, it
applies the improved equations to compute the double that matches the binary
order of that bit. For example, if the first one bit was found at the third position
from right, one applies the 2nd double equations.
Figure 4: First Proposed Algorithm.
One can take advantages of the parallelization characteristic offered by the
new equations. Namely, assuming that the x coordinate is always computed
before y, then one can start steps from the next doubling operation before the
end of the current one. This saves at least M + 1 clock cycles (see Figure 3).
Moreover, mixed addition provides more efficiency to addition and doubling
elliptic curve algorithms, especially for large parameters [1]. Figure 4 shows
the steps for calculating P + [k]Q for our algorithm when the scalar is a 5-bit
number (12)10 = (01100)2. This parallelization characteristic can be applied to
all algorithms described further.
In Algorithm 2 the Right-to-Left extension is further generalized to support
dynamic implementation of the doubling to high orders, as a combination of
available implementations of lower order that provide the optimal combined
performance (at Line 2.2).
In Line 2.1 of the pseudocode, the counter l is initialized with value zero.
We scan for the next 1-bit to detect whether there is a following double to be
launched in parallel, once the computations of the x and y coordinates start.
In Line 2.2 the repeated doubling is applied to the point to the order that is
specified by the counter l.
In Algorithm 1 at Line 1.1 this is performed directly from one of the new
doubling equations, while in Algorithm 2 at Line 2.2 one uses a knapsack opti-
mization to select a combination of available repeated doubling techniques that
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procedure MultiplyR2L(k, P) do
R := O;
H := P;
if |k| > 0 and k0 == 1 then R = H;
for (int i := 1; i < |k|; ) do
1.1 l := 0;
do
l + +;
i+ +;
while (ki == 0 and l < 4);
1.2 H := 2lH;
1.3 if (ki) then ‖parallel(R := R+H)‖;
1.4 return R;
Algorithm 1: Right-to-left Extensions
procedure MultiplyR2LKnapsack(k, P) do
R := O;
H := P;
if |k| > 0 and k0 == 1 then R := H;
for (i := 1; i < |k|; ) do
2.1 l := 0;
do
l + +;
i+ +;
while (ki == 0);
2.2 H := DoubleKnapsack(H, l);
2.3 ‖parallel(R := R+H)‖;
2.4 return R;
Algorithm 2: Right-to-Left Knapsack
best together produce multiplication with 2l (this being the main difference
between the two algorithms).
As we see in Line 2.3, the algorithm provides the opportunity to parallelize
aforementioned independent computations. Finally, in Line 2.4, the register R
will have the final result.
6.2 Double and Add Extensions
In Section 3 it is shown how to compute all intermediate exponent and mix
doubling with a differential addition with a single inverse. The left-to-right
algorithm starts scanning from left the next one-bit considering that the most
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significant bit is one. Then, it decides weather it applies doubling or doubling
and addition depending on the data being read. For instance, if the first two one
bits were representing the binary equivalent (101)2 which is 510, it will multiply
the base by 4 because it was shifted to the left by two bits. Since the last bit
scanned is a 1, it also applies a differential addition to the point being doubled
with the base point. Thus, the implementation will be 4Q+Q. Figure 5 shows
a practical example for calculating Q47. This technique computes Q47 with
only four inverses, instead of the eight inverses when performing the original
equations.
procedure MultiplyL2RKnapsack(k, P) do
if |k| ≤ 0 or k|k|−1 == 0 then return O;
D := P;
for (int i := |k| − 2; i ≥ 0; ) do
l := 0;
do
i - -;
l ++;
while (ki == 0 and i ≥ 0);
if ki == 1 then
3.1 D := DoubleAndAddKnapsack(D, l, P);
else
3.2 D := DoubleKnapsack(D, l);
return D;
Algorithm 3: Double and Add Extensions
In Line 3.1 of the pseudocode of the Double-and-Add extensions we apply
the DoubleAndAddKnapsack function taking as parameter the counter l that
specifies the current bit location, and the base point P to be added at the end.
Otherwise, we apply the DoubleKnapsack function that computes the shifting
to the left by multiplying the D value with 2l, which is the same as the function
used in Algorithm 2.
6.3 NAF Extensions
The last proposed algorithm is a version of the Left-to-Right algorithm called
Double-Add-and-Subtract. The original Double-Add-and-Subtract minimizes
the number of 1s in the binary representation of the scalar by repeatedly de-
tecting sequences of k 1-bit at position (i) to (i + k − 1) and replacing them
with 2i+k − 2i. The initialization of this technique minimizes the Hamming
weight of a scalar multiplication by using the non-adjacent form (NAF). Likely,
with a random scalar multiplier, half of the bits in its original binary repre-
sentation will be non-zero. However, with NAF’s special representation this
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Figure 5: Left-to-Right Proposed Algorithm.
will be dropped to one third. For example, 1510 = 11112. This is rewritten
as (16 − 1)10 = 〈1, 0, 0, 0,−1〉, where sequences 〈bk, ..., b0〉 are interpreted as∑k
i=0 2
ibi for bi ∈ Z, most commonly used with bi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. The Left-to-
Right Double-Add-and-Subtract Algorithm in the past could not improve upon
three leading 1s, but the new efficient 8P , algorithm can improve speed for se-
quences of 3 leading 1s. One can predict automatically the fastest combination
of repeated doubling operations. Figure 6 shows the same example, calculating
[47]Q by applying the Left-to-Right Double-Add-and-Subtract Algorithm. This
computes [47]Q with only two inverses unlike the Left-to-Right Double-and-Add
Algorithm that needed 4.
procedure MultiplyL2RMix(k, P) do
(m,B) := mixed NAF representation Knapsack(k);
D := multiply(P,m|m|−1);
for (int i := |m| − 2; i ≥ 0; ) do
// D := D ∗Bi + P ∗mi
D := RadixPromoteAndAdd(D, mi, Bi, P);
return D;
Algorithm 4: NAF Extensions
In general, for a number k, a mixed base representation m = mN ...m0, with
bases B = 〈BN , ..., B0〉, must have the property that
k =
N∑
i=0
mi
i−1∏
j=0
Bj
A canonical mixed base representation expects that ∀i, 0 ≤ mi < Bi, but with
NAF this additional condition is not enforced.
The Algorithm 4 starts by recasting k in a mixed base B with NAF rep-
resentation m, selected such that D ∗ bi + P ∗mi can be computed efficiently
given available software libraries (implementations of direct repeated doubling
operations). Then, the Multiply Left to Right Mix (MultiplyL2RMix) proceeds
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one digit at a time, promoting the current value based on the radix of the
corresponding position and adding/subtracting the digit’s multiple of the base
point P . The RadixPromoteAndAdd procedure can use memoisation dynamic
programming to store encountered multiples of the base P , and reuse them on
subsequent calls.
The simplest implementation of mixed NAF representation Knapsack is
base 16, namely where ∀i, bi = 16. Another alternative where base 32 can
be used at times, and base 16 any time, is in Algorithm 5.
procedure mixed NAF representation Knapsack(k) do
n := 0;
carry := 0;
for (int i := 0; i ≤ |k|;) do
j = min(|k − 1|, i + 4);
if (optimizable(kj ...ki + carry)) then
bn := 2
5;
else
j - -;
bn := 2
4;
(mn, carry) := NAF (bn, ki...kj + carry);
n ++;
i := j − 1;
if carry > 0 then mn := carry return (m, b)
Algorithm 5: Mix NAF Representation bases 16 and 32
Here procedure NAF reduces the current digit to an optimizable positive or
negative multiplier, and a carry value.
Figure 6: Left-to-Right Double-Add-and-Subtract Algorithm.
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7 Fast Multiplication with Base 16 Multiplicands
Here we mention a simple special case algorithm based on base 16 representa-
tions of the multiplicands. For example 35 = 2316. Then, for a multiplier of the
form qr16 the computation is implemented by as,
16(qP ) + rP mod p
For the scalar 10150 = 27A616, the obtained algorithm is equivalent to:
((16(2P ) + 7P )(16) + 10P )(16) + 6P mod p
If one precomputes the point 16P, then one can efficiently compute the point
10150P with the total of four inversions by applying the new direct equations
for 24P + nQ.
8 Conclusion
We have proposed optimized methods for computing scalar multiplication in
Elliptic Curves over a prime field, for the short Weierstrass form in the affine
plane. We have described a methodology for direct repeated point doubling
with high order, as well as point addition of the form nP + mQ by using a
single inversion. These new algorithms are shown to be significantly faster than
the original equations. In addition, we have developed optimized equations for
repeated doubling of orders that are higher compared to what is available with
related existing algorithms (up to 31).
In its second part the report introduces new fast elliptic curve multiplica-
tion procedures extending current variants and alternatives of Double-and-Add
to exploit mixed-base representations of the scalar multiplicand, potentially
in non-adjacent form, tuned to exploit available optimized implementations of
given scalars. Such given optimized scalars may either have special hardware
support or, for example, be using only a single inverse when working in the affine
plane. Parallelization opportunities are also highlighted. Our empirical imple-
mentation indicates that proposed equations outperform the original methods
and also provides a significant speed-up when implemented in hardware.
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